Thursday, March 10, 2011

WalMart Ethik und soziale Verantwortung (WalMart Ethics and Social Responsibility, in German) [2of3]

Shortly after these considerations rolled out, there was a passage wrestling with the idea of ethnocentric versus geocentric. With this writer confesses being confounded by such a drumbeat for the either or, that everything seems to have to be painted in black and white terms. Why cannot this be nuanced and be both considerations of ethnocentric and geocentric? Is there not something to be learned of each?


Now about a quarter of the way into the article we find ourselves in the arena of culture itself. Wal-Mart had the opportunity to do a better job of deconstructing the culture, doing a match as to how they do business and how the Germans or French do business. I do not know that they did not do this, but it appears they did not (or not thorough enough). Alternatively, it could be that even after the research, they did not do a proper job of synchronizing what they learned with what was wanted and needed.

With the pre-successes of Carrefour and Ahold, how much of that “technology” (knowledge management, et.al.) did they steal, emulate or otherwise seek to learn? That remains undocumented.

Then the truth comes out: “Wal-Mart's strategy to date has been to acquire companies with the potential to be moulded to the "Wal-Mart way"”. What school of management told the highly paid executives that you take items that are overseas that are working (so you have a foothold, some entrĂ©e), and then you start to mold them to your way of doing business? Did that miss the point of acquiring (yes)? Part of the value of making such an acquisition is the ability to leverage the cultural subtleties as they are. If anybody needed re-molding it was Wal-Mart.

Wal-Mart is nothing if not consistent for shortly after the previous passage, this one appears, “introduce the Wal-Mart concepts and philosophy, and prove ourselves.” Instead of re-inventing WalMart consistent with the new context, which would afford the customer a part of a foundational conversation, instead we see a separate moving part seeking partnership.

Finding ourselves out nearly halfway into the article, we begin to see some excuses. As for Germany, they cite high labor costs. However, how much of this is consistent with how Germans actually ARE, not just something to put on the shoulders of labor costs.

There is also the mention of a demanding regulatory environment. In sum – they do not play games, and are somewhat the antithesis of what goes on in the US. There is no coupon culture in Germany, no “buy one get one” opportunities. If a German marketer can give a price break, the Germans simply expect them to do so. Pricing in Berlin and Stuttgart (or anywhere else) cannot vary more than 5%.

As they pointed to customer service as a way to make a difference , what did they do to drive a customer service imperative that would rival the best they are able to muster in the States (not that I would call that a benchmark of excellence). It is this writer's understanding that the greeters in Germany had to be removed, as Germans saw this as a form of being accosted.

Again, this points to the difference of reforming what has worked specifically for a market, versus laying down what had worked where you are from on top of, and making tweaks.

Not getting the hint that Germans do not play games, Wal-Mart “was fined $308,000 in September of 2000, for selling goods below cost (Retail Week, 2000).

They impose standards on the German operations (again, this is exactly what does not work). They attempted to remake the European supply chain in their own understanding and image (instead of applying Wal-Mart wisdom to what already was working), only to find that “Deliveries failed to arrive on time and out-of-stock rates jumped.”

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